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I. INTRODUCTION
he horror of aircraft accidents continues to plague modern
society. They remain vivid in our collective consciousness,
reminding us of our vulnerability to random tragedy.' Yet, the
legal problems raised by an aviation delict or tort case have received little examination in the United Kingdom, either by the
courts or commentators.
It is rare that such a case will be entirely focused in a domestic
context. Aviation is by its nature transitory and "the speed, mo-

T

bility, and range of modern aircraft ...

and the resulting multi-

state or multi-country contacts with aircraft supply, operations,
and accident or incident" 2 mean that in any one case it is likely
that several legal systems may appear to be applicable.
This Article will examine what choice of law rule a court in
the United Kingdom, when faced with an aviation delict or tort
case, would and should apply. It will examine the effect of international convention on the subject and then look to the example of the United States where most aviation disaster litigation
has been focused over the years. It will trace the evolution of
choice of law theories that has taken place in the United States,
which, although not exclusive to the field of tort or aviation tort,
can be clearly seen in this field. But this Article will limit itself to
the problem of the law applicable to an aviation delict or tort
case, touching only peripherally issues of jurisdiction.
The aim of this Article is open to the criticism that the exercise is futile. Aviation litigation has been concentrated in the
United States, while courts in the United Kingdom have had little opportunity to deal with the problems that arise. But one
cannot be sure that this will always be the case. A coherent and
sophisticated legal system should be prepared and willing to
cope with future developments.
The future of the airline industry in Europe is uncertain; but
it seems probable that the deregulation that took place in the

I See In reAir Disaster at Lockerbic,

Scot. on Dec. 21, 1988, 37 F.3d 804, 810-11

(1994).
2 STUART M. SPEISER & CHARLES

F.

KRAUSE, 1 AVIATION TORT LAW

60 (1978).
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United States domestic markets in 1978 will extend to Europe.3
Following a series of Council "packages" of measures from 1987
until 1993, national airline monopolies are no longer permitted.
Airlines may charge whatever fares they wish, subject to the right
of a member state to intervene if they are excessively high or
low, and can generally operate between any two points of their
choice within the European Community. The manifest consequence of this liberalization has been the setting-up of low-cost
airline companies flying more routes. The danger is, that in an
endeavor to keep operating costs and therefore fares to a minimum, airlines will adopt laxer security standards and working
procedures that might lead to more aircraft mishaps. While the
rules on jurisdiction in the United States are flexible, it will not
always be possible to bring an action there, and cases will start to
be brought before the United Kingdom courts.
Changes in legal culture may also lead to more aviation litigation in the United Kingdom. Developments in other areas of
tort and delict, notably in the area of defamation, have brought
to public attention the possibility of recovering large sums of
damages. Furthermore, the first hand effects of the Lockerbie
disaster and the Piper Alpha disaster, have been to highlight
awareness as to the causes of mass disaster and the possibility of
obtaining legal redress. There is no longer a conceptual problem in demanding high levels of financial compensation for injury or death.
A further possible development is the arrival of contingency
fees in the United Kingdom. Although Scots lawyers are permitted to act on a "no win, no fee" basis, a development introduced
for the first time in England in 1995, 4 agreements by which the
amount of the fee is related to the sum recovered have always
been outlawed. However, there are signs that this situation may
be changing. The contingency fee is almost a necessity to litigating an aviation disaster case that involves a lengthy process of
pre-trial discovery and production. It allows potential claimants
who might not otherwise have the means to obtain legal representation to do so on the basis that they will have to pay lawyers'
fees only if they are successful in obtaining compensation and,
in that event, will pay fees related to the amount recovered.

SeeJohn M. Balfour, EC Air Transport Liberalisationon 1st April 1997 - Big Bang
WIG & GAVEL 22 (1997).
Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations 1995, S.I. 1995, No. 1675 (Eng.).

or April Fool?, 9
4

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

The underlying aim of this Article is to highlight the choice of
law issues that an aviation disaster raises and to suggest the possible solutions as to choice of law, which courts in Scotland and in
England and Wales might adopt if they were faced with such a
case. It is conceded that this is a speculative exercise, but it is
not a fruitless one. If the issues can be raised and debated
before the problems arise, it might be possible that Scots and
English law might arrive at coherent and workable solutions and
thereby avoid what has been termed in the United States as the
"veritable jungle, which . . . leads not to a 'rule of action' but
a
reign of chaos dominated in each case by the judge's 'informed
guess' as to what some other state than the one in which he sits
would hold its law to be."5
An aviation delict or tort case provides the perfect example of
the hybrid nature of International Private Law rules. While the
area has been partially dealt with by international convention, 6
choice of law considerations are vital in this area. This highlights the fact that while the aims of uniformity and unification
in International Private Law are desirable, they are often not
realistic. 7 The need for a coherent and sophisticated system of
In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 739 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
6 See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1988) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention]. The Warsaw Convention was amended by the Hague Protocol 1955
and the Guadalajara Convention 1961. Protocol to Amend the Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage of Air, opened
for signature,Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter Hague Protocol 1955];
Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air Performed by a Person Other than the
Contracting Carrier, Sept. 18, 1961, art. IV, 500 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Guadalajara Convention 1961]. The United Kingdom is signatory to all three texts.
Thus, there are three regulatory regimes for carriage by air: (1) international
carriage governed by the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol
and the Guadalajara Convention; (2) international carriage governed by the Warsaw Convention as amended only by the Guadalajara Convention; and (3) nonconvention carriage. The Warsaw Convention was incorporated into United
Kingdom law by the Carriage by Air Act 1932, the Hague Protocol by the Carriage by Air Act 1961, and the Guadalajara Convention by the Carriage by Air
(Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962. Carriage by Air Act of 1932, 22 & 23 Geo.
5, ch. 36 (Eng.) [hereinafter Carriage by Air Act 1932]; Carriage by Air Act of
1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, ch. 27 (Eng.) [hereinafter Carriage by Air Act 1961]. For the
purposes of this Article, there are no major differences among the regimes.
7 See Rene H. Mankiewicz, The JudicialDiversificationof Uniform PrivateLaw Conventions-The Warsaw Convention's Days in Court, 21 INT'l. & Comp. L.Q. 718
(1972).
5
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choice of law rules to back up the provisions of an international
convention becomes all the more acute.
II.

THE EFFECT OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
A.

GENERAL

With the growth of the international air transportation industry at the turn of the century, it became clear that the legal regime that was to apply to the rights of passengers and the
liability of carriers required clarification. It developed largely
on the model of the law concerning carriage by land and sea,
but it was evident that this model was inappropriate for carriage
by air. The Warsaw Convention, which was the work of a specialist committee of the Conference Internationale de Droit Priv6
A~rien, was drawn up in 1929 and sought to provide a uniform
set of rules that would eliminate any conflict of laws issues that
might otherwise arise.
The Convention is founded upon a fault-based system of liability,' but liability that is expressly limited. Thus, while guaranteeing recovery for the passenger upon proof of damage, it also
assured the financial liability of carriers. "It was hoped that the
limitation would provide a favorable environment for the
growth of the then infant international air transportation
industry."9

The overriding aims of the Convention were uniformity and
the elimination of all conflict of laws problems. It has been suggested that 'Judicial interpretation .

.

. threatens to destroy the

uniformity which was a principal objective of its authors."' l It is
common ground among all commentators that the aim of uniformity was the crucial one at the outset. In one of the earliest
judgments dealing with the Convention," Greene L.J. saw its
purpose and major advantage to be "the desirability of excluding considerations of different systems of law and any possible
2
conflict between them."'
8 On the background to the system of liability under the Warsaw Convention,
see Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, Liability for PersonalInjury and Death Under the Warsaw Convention and Its Relevance to Fault Liability in Tort Law, 21 ANNALS AiR &
SPACE

L. 1 (1996).

9 Kimberlee S. Cagle, The Role of Choice of Law in DeterminingDamagesforInternational Aviation Accidents, 51 J. AIR L. & COM. 953, 955-56 (1985).
10 CHRISTOPHER N. SHAWCROSS & KENNETH M. BEAUMONT, AIR LAw VII/39 (Peter Martin et al. eds., 1997).
11 See Grein v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., 1 K-B. 50 (C.A. 1937).
12 Id. at 79-80.
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This may well have been the praiseworthy aim of the Convention, but given the manner in which the Convention was
drafted, uniformity was never a realistic nor possible outcome.
The Convention contains several glaring lacunae that prevent it
from constituting anything like a uniform code of rules. Its very
title, Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Carriage by Air, implies that an all-encompassing code of international aviation law was never a possibility. So
many important questions were left for resolution by the choice
of law system that a uniform system of law was never achievable.
The scope of the Convention is expressly confined to a particular definition of international air transportation, and there will
be cases that raise choice of law elements, which remain outwith
this scope. The Convention does not provide a rule of substantive law for all the matters which may arise. And, importantly,
the Convention only covers the relationship between passenger
and carrier, ignoring the liabilities of aircraft manufacturers.
The Convention lays down a certain number of rules of law,
which take the questions concerned out of the realm of domestic delictual and tortious concepts. The main area of controversy is whether the Convention creates its own independent
cause of action, which, when relied upon, is outwith the scope of
domestic law, including choice of law rules. Related to this is
the question of whether the cause of action under the Convention is an exclusive one or if misconduct that falls outwith its
scope may nonetheless be acted upon.
Chapter III of the Convention establishes the overall scheme
of liability. Under Articles 17-19's the carrier is prima facie liable for death, wounding or any bodily injury, damage to baggage or cargo, and damage caused by delay on proof of damage.
The major defense available to the carrier is to prove that it took
all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible to avoid it." However, since the burden of proof of this
defense rests with the carrier, this is a form of strict liability. In
any event, the amount of the carrier's liability is limited to certain maximum sums laid down in the Convention.' 5 This cap is
lifted if the plaintiff can prove that the damage was caused by
intentional or reckless misconduct on the part of the carrier, his
13 Article 17 deals with death, wounding, or any other bodily injury; Article 18
with damage caused to cargo and baggage; and Article 19 with damage caused by
delay.
14 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 20.
15 See id. art. 22.
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servants, or his agents.16 These provisions relate to provable
damages and are not due as of right to the passenger or his
representative. In these areas, therefore, the Convention provides uniform rules of law, which exclude any conflict of laws
considerations.
However, more importantly for present purposes are the matters for which a uniform rule of law is not provided. Questions
of contributory negligence,' 17 the form of payment of damages,18
matters of procedure, 19 the method of calculation of the Convention's two year limitation period, 20 and in the original version of the Convention, the scope of the term "wilful
misconduct," which was required to lift the carrier's liability limitation,21 are all governed by the lexfori.
B.

ARTICLE 24

No choice of law rule is provided for issues relating to recoverable damages. Article 24(1) refers to "any action for damages"
without specifying which law will govern the heads of damages
for which compensation may be sought. In an action for death
or injury, Article 24(2) states that any action brought under the
Convention is "without prejudice . . . to who are the persons

who have the right to bring a suit and what are their respective
rights." 22 Such issues fall to be determined by the domestic law
of states that are parties to the Convention, which must include
their choice of law rules.
The provisions of Article 24 raise two questions: first, whether
the Warsaw Convention creates its own cause of action, which
therefore excludes the application of domestic law and thus
conflict of laws problems; and second, whether conduct that
falls outwith the scope of the Convention is precluded from an
action in domestic law.
The issue is far from settled. Early cases held that "the Convention was effective only to impose its terms on actions other16 See
17 See
18 See
19 See

id.
id.
id.
id.

art. 25.
art. 21.

art. 22(1).
art. 28(2).
20 See id. art. 29(2).
21 See id. art. 25. This was amended by the Hague Protocol to cover acts and
omissions done with intent and knowledge that damage would probably result,
and the reference to lexfori was removed.
22 See id. art. 24.

202

JOURNAL OFAIR LAW AND COMMERCE

wise founded in law."23 It has been the subject of recent judicial
activity both in the United Kingdom and in the United States.
The American case of Benjamins v. British EuropeanAirways arose
out of the 1972 crash at Staines, England of a British European
Airways (BEA) Trident en route from London Heathrow to
Brussels.2 ' The crash was caused by the premature retraction of
the forward flaps on the main wings during take off that produced a stall. One hundred and twelve passengers and crew
were killed. This was the first American case to hold that "the
thereby enabling
Warsaw Convention creates causes of action,
25
plaintiffs to sue under its terms directly.

Focusing on the overriding aim of uniformity that guided the
drafters of the Convention, a majority of the court found that
"[w]hile it is not literally inconsistent with [the Convention's]
universal applicability to insist that a would-be plaintiff first find
in . .. domestic law
an appropriate cause of action
26
inconsistent with its spirit.

. . . ,

it is

However, there was a strong dissenting opinion from Judge
Van Graafeiland who noted that since the Convention does not
specify who is entitled to sue under it, and what heads of damages a plaintiff is entitled to sue for, "Article 17 at best goes only
half way towards creating a cause of action. 2 v In effect, Article
24 "had the effect of subjecting whatever remedy might locally
28
be at hand to the conditions and limits imposed by the treaty."
The Benjamins decision left the issue open for a judicial debate. In Floyd v. EasternAirlines, Inc., it was held that the Convention pre-empts only those aspects of a plaintiff's claim that are
incompatible with it.2 9 The court declined to take a view on

whether the Convention wholly precluded any state cause of action in any tort arising from an international aviation accident.
Recently, the issue has been confronted head on. In one case
arising from the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie
in 1988, which dealt with the availability of punitive damages
23 Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. Rliv. 497, 518 (1967).
24 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978).
25 Steven R. Pounian & Blanca Rodriquez, Recent Developments in Aviation Law,
31 TORT & INS. L.J. 149, 150 (1996).
26 Benjamins, 572 F.2d at 917-18.
27 Id. at 921.
28 N.R. McGilchrist, Does the Warsaw Convention Govern Non-contractualLiability?,
[1983] LMCLQ 685, 687.
2,) 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
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under the Convention, it was held that "state causes of action
are preempted when the state claim falls within the scope of the
Convention."3 This was found to flow from "the need for a single, unified rule on such points as the recoverability of punitive
damages.'

1

The weakness of this argument is immediately obvious, since
the issue of recoverable damages is one for which the Convention does not provide a uniform rule of law. Importantly, the
Second Circuit maintained the right to a cause of action for conduct that did not arise under the Convention.
The issue received its most thorough examination by the
United States Supreme Court in Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines
Co., Ltd.3 2 This case arose from the shooting down of a Korean
Air Lines flight that strayed into Soviet air space. The particular
issue was the availability of damages for loss of society. The
opinion of the Court by Justice Scalia concluded that Articles 17
and 24(2) together "permit compensation only for legally cognizable harm, but leave the specification of what harm is legally
cognizable to the domestic law applicable under the forum's
choice-of-law rules. ' 3 It would seem therefore that while the
Convention unifies liability issues, it merely provides a conduit
for the application of the substantive law on damages and title
to sue, which would apply in the absence of the Convention.
This decision represented a major retreat from the previous
position and was endorsed in a subsequent Lockerbie case. In
Pescatore v. Pan American World Ainvays, Inc., 4 which has gained
notoriety because of the jury award of $19,000,000 to the wife of
a thirty-three year old victim of the Lockerbie disaster, it was
held that "the law that governs damages.., must be determined
in accordance with the choice of law rules of the forum
jurisdiction."
It is submitted that this is the correct position. The Warsaw
Convention sets down uniform rules on liability which protect a
plaintiff from an unfortunate domestic lex loci delicti that might,
for instance, exclude the liability of a state air carrier for an aircraft crash. However, it leaves open damages issues for resoluIn reAir Disaster at Lockerbie, Scot. on Dec. 21, 1998, 928 F.2d 1267, 1273
(2d Cir. 1991).
31 Id. at 1274.
32 516 U.S. 217 (1996).
3 Id. at 231.
34 97 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 1996).
35 Id. at 5.
30
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tion by domestic law. This recognizes that it would be
unrealistic to search for a uniform rule on recoverable damages
and title to sue, "which are basic to the laws of tort and contract
and therefore of wide-reaching significance, for the sole purpose of unifying and accommodating all matters relating to the
law of the air carrier's liability. '3 6 The right to sue for damages
and the amount that may be recovered is personal to each case,
and, as will be argued later in this Article, it is not wrong in
principle that there should be different levels of recovery by victims of the same accident.
More recently, the Second Circuit has reaffirmed its position
on the issue of exclusivity in the clearest terms. In Tseng v. El Al
Israel Airlines, Ltd., the court held that "state claims are not precluded by the Warsaw Convention where the event or occurrence giving rise to the injury is found to be outside the
Convention. '"" In a searching examination of the Convention's
text itself and its drafting history, the court found that both as a
matter of construction of the scheme of the Convention and
consistent with its goal of protecting passengers, state law claims
arising outwith the Convention should not be excluded.
Unfortunately, judicial development in the United Kingdom
has not gone in the same direction as the American
jurisdictions.3"
The case of American Express Co. v. British Airways Board9 was
concerned with the liability in bailment of the defendants under
Article 18 of the Convention. The plaintiffs had given a package
of traveler's cheques to the defendants for delivery to Switzerland. The package was stolen in the course of loading at the
airport. The defendants admitted liability, but claimed statutory
immunity under the Post Office Act 1969.0
The plaintiffs contended that although an action in tort was
excluded by the 1969 Act, the Carriage by Air Act 1961, which
gave effect to the Warsaw Convention, gave rise to an independent and free-standing cause of action from which the defendants
could not claim immunity.
-6 Mankiewicz, supra note 7, at 741.
-17 122 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. granted in part, 118 S. Ct. 1793 (1998).
3 At the time of writing, an appeal to the Supreme Court in Tseng was pending. The result of this may well reverse the position.
31) [1983] 1 All E.R. 557.
4o Post Office Act, 1969, ch. 48, § 29(3) (Eng.). Section 29(3) extends the
immunity from proceedings in tort of the Post Office to "any person engaged in
or about the carriage of mail."

1998]
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Rejecting this approach, Lloyd J. assumed, without deciding,
that the Convention did indeed create an independent cause of
action, which became a statutory cause of action by the effect of
the Carriage by Air Act 1961. However, although this cause of
action was free-standing, it still fell within the ambit of the immunity from "proceedings in tort" established by the 1969 Act.
The judge had no doubt that "the phrase 'proceedings in tort'
was used in the more general sense, and therefore included
breaches of the statutory duty imposed on the defendants" by
the 1961 Act.'
The judge was of the view that in this case "the law . . . is

almost as simple as the facts."4 2 The reasoning fails to comprehend the scheme of the Convention and reveals a serious incoherence. On the one hand, the judge assumes that the
Convention creates its own cause of action on liability which, it
has been shown from United States authorities, flows from the
very scheme of the Convention. The plaintiff is entitled to recover on proof of damage, in return for which the carrier finds
the extent of his liability limited. Only exceptionally can the
carrier exonerate himself from liability, and only exceptionally
may the plaintiff overcome the liability limitation. However, by
finding that the carrier's liability is excluded by the effect of a
further statutory provision, the entire system is undermined.
The Convention creates its cause of action because it is supposed to provide uniform rules of law on the matters within its
regime. On matters which do not fall within its terms, it is submitted that the Convention is not the exclusive source of a cause
of action.
However, in a recent House of Lords case, the weaknesses of
the American Express judgment were endorsed and the incoherence of the position compounded. The joint appeals of Sidhu
and Abnett v. British Airways plc.43 arose from the same incident,
one case being raised in England, the other in Scotland. The
claimants were passengers aboard a British Airways flight from
the United Kingdom to Malaysia via Kuwait. The aircraft landed
for refueling in Kuwait about five hours after Iraqi troops had
begun to invade Kuwait at the start of the Gulf War in 1990.
The passengers and crew were taken prisoner by the Iraqi forces
and detained in Baghdad for about three weeks. The claimants
41

[1983] 1 All E.R. 557, 564.

42

Id. at 559.
1997 App. Cas. 430 (appeal taken from Scot. and Eng.).

43
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brought actions in common law negligence against the airline,
since their possible action under the Convention was timebarred and in any event did not fall within the terms of Article
17. They had not suffered a bodily injury nor had the act complained of taken place "on board the aircraft or in the course
of... embarking or disembarking." 4
The speech of Lord Hope of Craighead identified the main
issue as "whether the Warsaw Convention ...provides the exclusive cause of action and sole remedy for a passenger who claims
the
against the carrier for loss, injury and damage sustained in
45
air."
by
carriage
international
course of, or arising out of,
Lord Hope held that on the issue of the carrier's liability, the
Convention provided the exclusive remedy, which prevented
the plaintiffs from relying on the common law. Lord Hope
found that the Convention rests upon a compromise. On the
one hand, the carrier surrenders its right to limit or exclude its
liability,46 while the passenger is restricted in the claims for damages which he can bring in cases covered by Article 17 .17 Therefore, "[t]he idea that an action of damages may be brought by a
passenger against the carrier outside the Convention in the
cases covered by Article 17 ...seems to be entirely contrary to
the system which these two articles were designed to create."'4 8
By addressing the matter in this way, Lord Hope highlights
the weakness in his own argument. The negligence complained
of by the passengers in this case was not covered by Article 17,
since it did not constitute a bodily injury and did not take place
on board or in the course of embarking or disembarking. It
seems strange to fasten onto the system that these two Articles of
the Convention create to deal exclusively with a matter that is
not within the express ambit of those Articles.
Lord Hope, of course, interprets the Convention to mean that
all tortious misconduct that arises in the course of international
carriage by air does fall within the Convention scheme. In his
view, the Convention is exclusive in the matters with which it
deals, and the "liability of the carrier" in the broadest sense of
the term is one such matter. However, would it not be equally
convincing to argue that the question on which the scheme of
44

Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 17.

45 1997 App. Cas. at 435.
46

See Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 23.

47 See id. art. 24.
48 Sidhu and Abnett, 1997 App. Cas. at 447.
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the Convention is exclusive is the "liability of the carrier from an
accident arising in the aircraft or in the course of embarking or
disembarking," which is, after all, what Article 17 says?
It is conceded that for those matters with which it expressly
deals, the Convention does provide the sole cause of action and
exclusive remedy. For the matters that are not provided for, the
forum court must apply its own domestic law to fill the lacunae
and this includes its choice of law rules.
In an attempt to make the Convention an all-encompassing
code dealing with all matters arising from international carriage
by air, Lord Hope pushes to the limits the purposive interpretation that was favored in an earlier House of Lords case on the
Warsaw Convention.49 In the light of the resulting injustice to
the plaintiffs in this case, it is hard to see what purpose the Convention serves in excluding liability for conduct outwith its
terms.
Furthermore, Lord Hope considered but disregarded the earlier case of Gate'whiteLtd. v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana S.A. 5° in
which Gatehouse J. held that: "As the Convention does not expressly deal with the position by excluding the.., right of action
(though it could so easily have done so) the lexfoi
'5 1
the gap.

..

, can fill

In Abnett the judges in the Outer 52 and Inner Houses5" distinguished Gatewhite on the basis that it dealt with a different aspect
of the Convention, namely title to sue, for which the Convention
was not exhaustive. The House of Lords cast further doubt on
the Gatewhite judgment while not expressly overruling it. No
longer did it seem so vital to look at the Convention as a whole.
C.

NON-CONVENTION CARRIAGE BY AIR

The Convention is limited to certain types of international
carriage by air. It applies to international carriage by air, which
it defines as carriage where the place of departure and destination are within the territories of two High Contracting Parties,
or within the territory of a Single High Contracting Party, if
49 Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines Ltd., 1981 App. Cas. 251 (appeal taken from
Eng.). Lord Diplock argues for "a purposive construction to the Convention
looked at as a whole." Id. at 279.
50 [1990] 1 Q.B. 326.
51 Id. at 334.
52 1996 S.L.T. 529, 537 (Lord Mamoch).
53 See id. at 546 (Lord Clyde).
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there is an agreed stopping place within the territory of another
state, even one which is not party to the Convention."
Thus, a flight between Edinburgh and Paris will fall within the
terms of the Convention, as will a flight from Edinburgh to Glasgow, with an agreed stopping place in Paris. However, the Convention would not apply to a flight from Edinburgh to London,
nor from Edinburgh to Bangkok, since Thailand is not a signatory of the original Convention nor its amended versions.
The Carriage by Air Acts (Application of Provisions) Order
1967, Schedule 1,-1 governs cases concerning carriage by air to
which the Warsaw Convention does not apply, notably purely
domestic United Kingdom carriage. It basically applies the rules
of the Warsaw Convention to non-convention carriage in cases
that come before the United Kingdom courts. The scope of the
schedule was a matter of some controversy. The broad wording
of the Order in Article 3, applying to "all carriage by air, not
being carriage to which the . . .Convention applies," suggested

that the Schedule would apply to all non-convention carriage
irrespective of the parties, the place of departure, or the
destination.56
This was the view taken by Shawcross and Beaumont, 57 but it
was expressly rejected by the House of Lords in Holmes v. Bangladesh Biman Corporation.58 The plaintiff was the widow of a passenger who was killed when the defendants' aircraft crashed on an
internal domestic flight in Bangladesh. She sought to have the
Schedule to the 1967 Order applied, relying on the broad wording of Article 3, in order to escape the low liability limit of Bangladeshi domestic law, and benefit from the more favorable
liability limitations of the United Kingdom provision.
The House of Lords gave a restrictive interpretation to the
1967 Order, and the enabling provision of the 1961 Act, so that
Parliament would not be presumed to "legislate in the affairs of
foreign nationals who do nothing to bring themselves within its
jurisdiction.

'59

Thus, the variation of the Warsaw rules that the

1967 Order introduces were to apply only to wholly domestic
54 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 1 (2).

55 Carriage by Air Acts (Application of Provisions) Order 1967, S.I. 1967 No.

480.
Id. art. 3.
5 See SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 10, at 73.
58 1989 App. Cas. 1112 (appeal taken from Eng.).
59 Id. at 1127 (Lord Bridge).
56
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United Kingdom carriage and carriage from the United Kingdom to another non-convention country.
The result shows yet another gap in the Warsaw system which
would have to be filled by the normal choice of law rules. If a
United Kingdom court "had to address cases in ... excluded
categories.., they would have to apply the normal rules of the
courts in
conflict of laws to determine the applicable law, as do
60
Order.
1967
the
of
equivalent
no
with
jurisdictions
So, ifjurisdiction could be found in the United Kingdom, for
instance as the place of incorporation of the carrier, to bring an
action arising out of a crash on a domestic flight in another
country that was not party to the Convention, a choice of law
rule would have to be formulated to determine the applicable
law.
D.

PRODUCT LIABILITY CLAIMS AGAINST AIRCRAFT
MANUFACTURERS

The other major gap in the Warsaw system relates to the fact
that it only deals with the liability of air carriers. Many aircraft
mishaps arise from fundamental defects with the aircraft itself
rather than the manner in which it is operated. This leads to a
claim in product liability against the aircraft manufacturer.
This is a major consideration in an aviation disaster case, since
"aircraft manufacturing is concentrated in a few countries, but
the results of any negligence in manufacture may show themselves anywhere in the world."61 It is submitted that such considerations would be subject to the normal rules on choice of law
in delict and tort, which will be examined in more detail below.
The Warsaw Convention has therefore had a certain measure
of success in creating a uniform regime to deal with international aviation law; but there are several important topics that it
fails to address. These topics, namely issues of recoverable damages and title to sue, carriage outwith the defined scope of the
Convention and the product liability of aircraft manufacturers,
remain subject to conflict of laws rules.

60 SHAWCROSS

61 Id. at 53.

&

BEAUMONT,

supra

note

10,

at

63.
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III.

UNITED KINGDOM CHOICE OF LAW RULE IN
DELICT AND TORT

A.

THE COMMON LAW POSITION

The common law rule on choice of law in delict and tort was
based on the old authority of Phillips v. Eyre6 2 which required
that for a claim to succeed, it must be actionable by the lexfori
and not justifiable by the foreign lex loci delicti.
This was a slight variation on the Scottish position, expressed
in McElroy v. McAllister,6 3 which held that for a claim to succeed,
the requirements of both the lex loci and the lex fori had to be
met. In McElroy, the action of a Scottish widow whose husband
had been killed in a road accident in England was dismissed on
all three grounds of her claim. Her claim for solatium failed
since this was not available under English law. Her claim as executrix of his estate for suffering caused between the time of the
accident and the time of death failed because under Scots law
such a claim did not survive the victim's death. Her claim under
the Fatal Accidents Acts failed because it was outwith the prescription period of English law.
A leading case that purported to transform the choice of law
rule in this area was Chaplin v. Boys.64 Two speeches in the
House of Lords upheld the general rule that double actionability was required, but formulated an exception to it based on the
more flexible approaches that were developing in the United
States. Lord Hodson held that there may be a legal system that
would displace the application of the double actionability rule
if, because of its relationship with the occurrence and with the
parties, it had a greater concern with the case.6 5 Similarly, Lord
Wilberforce formulated something resembling a "proper law"
exception. 66
This was further developed by the Privy Council in Red Sea
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bouygues S.A., 67 where it was held that a
plaintiff could, in appropriate circumstances, raise a claim in respect of conduct actionable under the lex loci delicti even if it was
not actionable under the lexfori.
62 [1870] 6 L.R.-Q.B. 1.
63 1949 Sess. Cas. 110.
64

1971 App. Cas. 356 (appeal taken from Eng.).

65 See id. at 380.
66 See id. at 391.

67 [1995] 1 App. Cas. 190 (P.C.) (appeal taken from H.K).
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The common law position was greatly criticized.68 The lexfori
was given too prominent a position, even though it might have
no relevant connection with the delict in question. It also led to
injustice by effectively affording a defendant a defense under
two systems of law. If either defense applied, the claim would
fail. It was also unclear whether or not the Chaplin v. Boys exception applied in Scotland, and exactly how it was to be applied in
England.
B.

THE WRITERS

It is surprising how cursorily the problem of the choice of law
relating to aviation delict and tort is dealt with by the writers.
Anton merely concludes that "there is no relevant authority on
choice of law rules in relation to delicts committed in flight." 69
Elsewhere, it is suggested that "the ordinary choice of law rules
are, in theory, applicable." v°
Dicey and Morris also take the view that the common law
choice of law rules on tort would apply to torts committed on
board aircraft or collisions between aircraft. 71 This raises the immediate problem of what, for the purpose of the normal choice
of law rule on tort, should be considered the lex loci delicti. Here,
there is a conflict of opinion.
Dicey and Morris opt for the law of the country of registration
of the aircraft, introducing the concept of nationality of the aircraft, similar to the law of the flag of a ship. The other possibilities are to apply the law of the country over whose territory the
aircraft happens to be at the time of the act complained of, the
English common law if the aircraft is over the high seas, or the
general maritime law in the case of a collision. Dicey and Morris
reject these "because the connection of the aircraft and its passengers and crew with the territory of the countries over which it
flies is fortuitous and fleeting. "72
Their criticisms seem well-founded and raise obvious anomalies. If, for example, a delict occurs in the course of a flight
68 For a summary of the criticisms of the common law position, see 17 THE
LAWS OF SCOTLAND:

STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPEDIA,

301-306 (1987) [herein-

after STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPEDIA].
69 ALEXANDER E. ANTON, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw: A TREATISE FROM THE
STANDPOINT OF SCOTS LAw 410 (2d ed. 1990).
70 STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 68,
71 ALBERT

V.

DICEY

&JOHN H.C.

lins et al. eds., 12th ed. 1993).
72

Id.

300.

MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

1541 (L. Col-
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between Edinburgh and Milan, there are at least five potential
accident sites7" and therefore potentially applicable laws, which
might change within a matter of minutes. If the delict were
committed by a Korean citizen on a Chinese plane in the course
of a flight over the open waters of the Pacific Ocean, the applicable law would appear to be the English common law. If an
American and a Dutch plane collided over the open waters of
the Atlantic, the general maritime law of England or Scotland
would seem to be applicable.
McNair suggests that it is inappropriate to draw an analogy
between a ship and an aircraft for these purposes. Carriage by
sea takes place over a longer period of time and predominantly
on the high seas, which explains the need to assimilate a ship to
the territory of its country of registration. Aircraft operate in a
completely different context and "there is ...much less connec-

tion between persons and goods aboard an aircraft and the
country of its registration than in the case of a ship."7 It is more
accurate to compare an aircraft to a motor car driven across a
country with which the driver and the passengers have no
connection.
In McNair's view, torts committed on-board aircraft or collisions between aircraft would be governed by the law of the country through whose airspace the aircraft was flying at the time of
the incident. If the incident occurred over the high seas, the
common law, in the case of acts internal to the aircraft, or the
general maritime law of Scotland or England, in the case of collision between aircraft, would therefore be applicable.
C.

THE LAW COMMISSIONS' APPROACH

The most authoritative statements on the state of English and

Scots choice of law in this field come in the joint working paper75 and report7" of the English Law Commission and Scottish
Law Commission.
73 Scotland, England, France, Italy, English Channel.
71 LORD McNAIR, THE LAW OF THE AIR 263 (M.R.E. Kerr & A.H.M. Evans eds.,

1964).
75 See LAW COMMISSION, WORKING PAPER No. 87 AND SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATrVF MEMORANDUM No. 62, Private International Law: Choice of
Law in Tort and Delict (1984), [hereinafter LAw COMMISSION WORKING PAPER
No. 87 AND ScOTTISIH LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATIVE MEMORANDUM No. 62].
76 See LAw COMMISSION, REPORT No. 193 AND SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, REPORT No. 129, Private International Law: Choice of Law in Tort and Delict
(1990) [hereinafter LAw COMMISSION REPORT No. 193 AND SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION REPORT No. 129].
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The Working Paper found the state of law to be that for torts
confined to one aircraft over the high seas, the lex fori should
apply, the law of the state of registration being irrelevant.7" In
all other cases, the same rule as that for ships would apply, the
relevant locus delicti being the subjacent territory or territorial
waters. 78 The effect of the uniform rules of the Warsaw Convention was also recognized in the Working Paper. In a case to
which the rules contained in the Convention apply, the choice
79
of law rule in delict and tort would be inapplicable.
The Law Commissions thereafter submitted certain models of
proposed reform. The working paper contains the extraordinary statement that "whatever the present law may be in this limited field, we are not aware that it gives rise to any problem."80
Surely the fact that not even the Law Commissions were able to
give a definitive answer as to the existing state of the law in this
area is a problem enough. Furthermore, this approach implies
that only those areas of delict and tort in International Private
Law that quantitatively can be said to be important merit adequate treatment by the study that the Law Commissions
undertook.
The Law Commissions submitted that the proposed reformed
choice of law rule should not apply to collisions occurring on
the high seas, to which the principles of maritime law extend.8 '
For torts internal to one aircraft, the law of the state to which
the aircraft belongs should apply.8 2 For the rare case of conduct
not confined to a single aircraft, but which was not covered by
the general maritime law, occurring over the high seas83 to
which the Law Commissions proposed new rule would apply,84
the law of the state to which the aircraft belongs would apply.
The Law Commissions attempt to formulate a rule for aircraft
that might bring them within the ambit of the proposed new
choice of law rule on tort and delict in general. They go to ex77 LAw COMMISSION

PAPER No. 87 AND SCOTTISiH
No. 62, supra note 75,
2.113.

WORKING

CONSULTATIVE MEMORANDUM

LAw COMMISSION

See id.
See Goldman v. Thai Airways Int'l Ltd., [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1186.
80 LAW COMMISSION WORKING PAPER No. 87 AND SCOTTISI-i LAw COMMISSION
CONSULTATIVE MEMORANDUM No. 62, supra note 75, 1 5.72.
81 See id.
82 See id.
5.76-.77.
83 One of the examples given in the Working Paper is of a defamatory statement communicated from one plane to another.
84 Ultimately the law on defamation is expressly excluded from the scope of
the new choice of law rule.
78

79
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treme lengths to locate a territorial attachment for the event
which constitutes the delictual or tortious act. The solutions
they devise are unnecessarily artificial and complex.
The Law Commissions proposed that a uniform approach be
adopted for both ships and aircraft.8 5 This is somewhat shortsighted, since the Commissions previously recognized that "the
legal treatment [in other areas of the law] accorded to aircraft is
not entirely analogous to that accorded to ships."8 6 There is recent judicial authority for this proposition, where in the context
of arrestment of an aircraft in the hands of its owner, it has been
held that: "[w] hile there are certain similarities between aircraft
and ships, it does not follow that the special rule which allows
arrestment of ships in their owners' hands applies to, or ought
87
to be extended to apply to, aircraft.
The Law Commissions expressly declined to make special provision for cases involving aircraft. This was something of a
missed opportunity. Instead, they maintained the artificial distinction between events occurring over territorial waters and
those occurring over the high seas. As to the former, the proposed choice of law rule would apply. As to the latter, no proposed changes were made. "Implementing legislation should
not extend to those torts and delicts occurring on the high seas
to which, at present, our choice of law rules do not apply."8 8
The result we are left with is a confused series of examples to
which a different applicable law might be applied, instead of
what one might have hoped for, a uniform and workable choice
of law rule. The Law Commissions' analysis rests on the search
for a territorial attachment for aircraft, the inappropriate analogy drawn between ships and aircraft, and the artificial division
drawn between territorial waters and the high seas.

85

LAw COMMISSION REPORT

No. 129, supra note 76,

No. 193

AND ScoTTisH LAW COMMISSION REPORT

3.26.

86 LAW COMMISSION WORKING PAPER No.

87

AND SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION

2.113.
No. 62, supra note 75,
87 Emerald Airways Ltd. v. Nordic Oil Services Ltd., 1996 S.L.T. 403, 405 (Lord
Hamilton).
CONSULTATVE MEMORANDUM

88 LAw COMMISSION R EPORT No.

No. 129, supra note 76,

3.27.

193 AND ScorFIsHi LAw COMMISSION REPORT
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PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS)

ACT

1995

Part III of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 199589 was the result of the Law Commissions' consultation paper 9° and report." Section 10 of the new Act abolishes
the common law rules to the extent that the double actionability
rule applied.9 2 Section 14(2) provides that nothing in the new
Act "affects any rule of law (including rules of private international law) except those abolished by section 10 above. 9 3
It is not clear whether or not the new statutory provisions will
have any effect on the choice of law rule applicable to aviation
delict and tort. If these situations were not covered by the old
common law rule, neither will they now be covered by the
scheme of the Act.
The new Act applies to delictual and tortious conduct
whether occurring in the United Kingdom or overseas. The applicable law will be that of the country in which the events constituting the delict or tort occur.9 4 The Act further provides a
displacement rule. If it would be "substantially more appropriate for the applicable law for determining the issues arising in
the case, or any of those issues, to be the law of ... [an]other
country,"9" the general rule in section 11 may be set aside. This
implicitly allows for the concept of dipevage, which, although
contrary to the recommendation of the Law Commissions,9 6 is
in line with modern thinking in the United States.9 7
If the incident involves a collision over the high seas, it would
appear that maritime law as applied by the forum would be ap89 Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 ch. 42 [here-

inafter Private International Law Act].
90 See LAW COMMISSION WORKING PAPER No. 87 AND SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION
CONSULTATIVE MEMORANDUM No. 62, supra note
91 See LAW COMMISSION REPORT No. 193 AND

75, 2.113.
SCOrTISH LAW

COMMISSION RE-

No. 129, supra note 76, 1 3.27.
92 Private International Law Act, supra note 89, § 10.

PORT

93 Id. § 14(2).
94 See id. § 11(1). According to section 11(2), this is to be taken as being (a)

for a claim in personal injury or death arising from personal injury, the law of the
country where the individual was when he sustained the injury; (b) for a claim for
damage to property, the law of the country where the property was when it was
damaged; (c) in all other cases, the law of the country in which the most signifi-

cant elements of the event occurred.
95 Id. § 12.
96 See LAw COMMISSION REPORT No. 193 AND ScoTrISH LAw COMMISSION RE-

PORT No. 129, supra note 76,
3.52.
97 See Reese, infra notes 205-207 and accompanying text.
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plied, drawing on a comparison between aircraft and ships. If
the tort was internal to the aircraft over the high seas, Dicey and
Morris suggest that the English common law would apply."
These situations are not affected by the new Act, since the rules
abolished by section 10 did not previously apply.
However, Dicey and Morris are of the opinion that "the flexibility of sections 11 and 12 of the 1995 Act could probably satisfactorily accommodate such situations."9 By ascribing a
nationality to an aircraft on the grounds of its country of registration, the tort could be regarded as having taken place in the
country of registration. This would bring the case more easily
within the scope of the abolished common law rules, and thus
within the scope of the new statutory scheme.
If the collision or internal incident occurs over the territory or
territorial waters of a country, then the law of the country to
which the airspace belongs would apply. Again, Part III of the
1995 Act would not be applicable, since the common law would
not have been applicable in such a case. Again, however, the
common law rule could be viewed as having encompassed these
situations so that the new Act would apply. This would bring to
aviation delict and tort cases the flexibility for which the new Act
seeks to provide.
It would appear, therefore, that unless all situations involving
aircraft are held to fall within the scope of the Act, there will be
a different law applicable depending on whether the delict or
tort occurs on the high seas, in territorial waters, or over land.100
In view of the fortuitous nature of an aircraft's connection with
the airspace over which it flies, this result seems merely to add to
the sense of obscurity and injustice.
All of these solutions attempt to draw inappropriate analogies
with ships and motor-cars to find a choice of law solution. As a
, See DicFy & MORRIS, supra note 71, at 190 (3d ed. Supp. 1996).
I/d.

'00 SeeJames Blaikie, Choice of Law in Delict and Tort: Reform at Last!, 1 ELR 361,

364 (1997).
The rule that, in the case of collisions on the High Seas, the Scottish courts apply the maritime law of Scotland ... will continue to

apply. However, other cases, as where the accident takes place on
the High Seas but is wholly internal to one vessel, or where the
delict occurs within the territorial waters of a foreign country, and
where, at common-law, the double actionability rule was applied,
will now be governed by the general rule and its displacement
exception.
Id. at 364.
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result, they are unnecessarily complicated and focus on the
wrong issues. Graveson observed that the "common law developed on the basis of the separate activities of movement on
land, sea, and in the air."10 1
Morse warns us that the exclusion from the scope of the 1995
Act of aerial torts that did not fall within the old common law
rule is "not free from difficulty."'1 °2 Nonetheless, he is of the

opinion that as a whole, the Act is a "sensible statutory framework within which courts will have a creative role to play in the
development of the law."' '° As a whole, that is a fair comment,
but in the particular situation of aviation delict and tort, the Act
fails adequately to take into account the particular nature of the
problems which arise.'0 4 There was a confused view of what the
law was before the reform process began which has led to a
missed opportunity to clear up what the relevant choice of law
rule should be.
The consequences of wrongful acts connected with aircraft go
far beyond what might result from any other examples of delictual liability, and our choice of law rule should reflect this. Personal injury or wrongful death in any circumstances are
traumatic for the victims and their relatives. However, when an
aircraft is involved, the manner of death or injury is horrific, the
pre-accident trauma of the victim is almost inconceivable, and
the distress of relatives and friends equally so. As an example of
the horrific results of a wrongful act committed in connection
with an aircraft, the Department of Transport report on the
Lockerbie disaster found that "l[t] he results of the post mortem
examination of the victims indicated that the majority had experienced severe multiple injuries at different stages, consistent
with the in-flight disintegration of the aircraft and ground impact ...

The bodies of 10 passengers were not recovered."'0 5

10, RONALD H. GRAVESON, CONFLICT OF LAWS - PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 585
(7th ed. 1974).
102 C.G.J. Morse, Torts in Private InternationalLaw: A New Statutory Framework, 45
INT'L COMP. & L.Q. 888, 889 n.16 (1996).
103 Id. at 902.
104 For criticism of a more general nature, see, e.g., Adrian Briggs, Choice of
Law in Tort and Delia, [1995] LMCLQ 519. For a comment on the new Act
aimed at a foreign audience, see Alexander E. Anton, Loi du Royaume-Uni portant
diverses dispositions en matire de droit internationalprivi, 85 REV. CRIT. DR. INT'L
PRiv. 267 (1996).
105 Department of Transport, Air Accidents Investigation Branch, Report on the
Accident to Boeing 747-121 N739PA at Lockerbie, Dumfriesshire, Scotland on 2 1st December 1988 30-31 (1990).
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As to the choice of law problems to which an aviation case
gives rise, there are so many potentially applicable laws, which
would arise by virtue of numerous connecting factors, such as
nationality of aircraft and passengers, country of departure,
stop-off or destination, country over whose airspace the aircraft
is flying at the time of the incident, and place of manufacture of
the aircraft and its component parts.
Our system of International Private Law requires formulation
of a choice of law rule that will adequately deal with these considerations and choose from what one writer has called "this embarrassing heap of connecting factors,"10 6 the one that is most
appropriate to the very particular nature of aviation delictual
and tortious liability. As a starting point, we will examine the
developments in this field in the United States.
IV.

DEVELOPMENTS IN TORT CHOICE OF LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES
As one leading writer in the field has observed, "although aviation cases represent only a small fraction of tort cases generally,
they constitute a remarkably large percentage of the historic
choice of law cases."' 7 It is thereby possible to trace the evolution of choice of law thinking in the United States through a
series of aviation tort cases. Choice of law plays a more important role in the United States in view of the federal nature of the
legal system. Conflicts of laws arise not only on an international
scale, but also at an inter-state level.
The choice of law evolution is remarkable in that it has been
focused in a short period of time. Until the mid-1960s, the
choice of law rule in tort was settled and uniform throughout
the United States.
A.

LEX

LOCI DELICTI

The standard and uniform rule on choice of law in tort which
was applied in all jurisdictions in the United States was that of lex
loci delicti, which submitted all issues arising out of the commission of a tortious act to the law of the state where the act was
committed. This rule was based on the theory of vested rights,
which formerly guided the formulation of choice of law rules
106 Michael Bogdan, Conflict of Laws in Air Crash Cases: Remarks from a European's
Perspective, 54J. AIR L. & COM. 303, 305 (1988).
107 LEE S. KREINDLER, 2 AVIATION ACCIDENT LAw § 16.02 (Blanca I. Rodriquez
ed., rev. ed. 1997).
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and justified the existence of the subject. This theory, which was
also defended at one time in the United Kingdom, notably by
Dicey, suggests that courts merely apply rights that have been
acquired under foreign law without actually applying the substantive law of a foreign country.
This theory has been shown to be fundamentally flawed. It is
based on the now out-dated view that "the enforcement of foreign law within a country necessarily constitutes an infringement
of that country's territorial sovereignty.""' 8 Furthermore, to suggest that the enforcement of a right that has been acquired in
another country does not equate to the enforcement of that
country's law is simply a play on words. However, the vested
rights theory became the cornerstone of the Restatement of
Conflict of Laws of 1934, which stated, "The law of the place of
wrong determines
whether a person has sustained a legal
9
10

injury."

The advantages of the rule are obvious. It is simple and predictable. In a mass tort case, it means that the same substantive
law will be applicable to all plaintiffs. It has been retained by
some states in the United States for these very reasons. One
court recently advocated its retention on the basis that "[t]he
newer approaches to choice of law problems are neither less
confusing nor more certain than the traditional approach. 'Until it becomes clear that a better rule exists, we will adhere to our
traditional approach."' 110
This argument for the status quo shows at best a lack of imagination, at worst conservative inertia. The lex loci delicti rule is
rigid and inflexible, allowing for no exception in cases where its
application will result in obvious injustice. In seeking to provide
a neutral choice of law rule, it fails to look to the underlying
policies of the conflicting laws, nor the needs of the parties.
And in an aviation context, the lex loci is often fortuitous.
Moreover, as Reese observed, "[p]redictability of result and
uniformity of decision are not .

.

. values of particular signifi-

law.'11

cance" in tort
The parties are not regulating their future
affairs according to what the substantive law applicable to their
relationship will be. In particular, the issue of recoverable dam108 ANTON,

supra note 69, at 28.

109RESTATEMENT (FirsT) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934).
110 Fitts v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 581 So. 2d 819, 823 (Ala. 1991)

(quoting General Tel. Co. v. Trimm, 311 S.E.2d 460, 462 (Ga. 1984)).
III Willis L.M. Reese, American Choice of Law, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 135, 135

(1982).
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ages is individual to each case, so uniformity is an irrelevant consideration in any event.
There was a growing dissatisfaction with the traditional lex loci
delicti rule. The reaction against it was led by modern writers of
the policy-evaluation school. Cheatham and Reese argued that
the forum should have regard for the policies behind potentially
applicable foreign laws and give effect to interests broader than
12
those expressed in its own substantive rules of law.'
Cavers proposed a different approach."' He argued that the
court should not stop at inquiring which of the competing jurisdictions should provide the substantive law by which a case will
be decided, but should analyze the policy behind the different
substantive rules and choose the correct system of law according
to its content.1 4 "The choice of that law would not be the result
of the automatic operation of a rule or principle of selection but
of a search for a just decision. "115

In the courts, the strict rule was gradually eroded by the creation of exceptions and by questionable characterization. In
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,' 16 a case arising out of a fatal
plane crash in Nantucket, Massachusetts, the New York court
purported to uphold its traditional choice of law rule, while using the forum's public policy exception to avoid the limitation
of recoverable damages of the locus law." 7 The court was heavily influenced by the fortuitous nature of the place of the accident. It pointed out that an aircraft "may meet with disaster in a
State [it] never intended to cross but into which the plane has
flown because of bad weather or other unexpected developments, or an airplane's catastrophic descent may begin in one
State and end in another."" 8
In another non-aviation wrongful death case, a different court
used the technique of characterization to circumvent the traditional lex loci rule."' The court characterized the issue of the
survival of the decedent's cause of action as one of "administraSee Elliott E. Cheatham & Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52
COLUM. L. R v. 959 (1952).
11- See David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. RL-v.
173 (1933).
114 See id. at 192-93.
11-Id. at 193.
116 172 N.E.2d 526 (N.Y. 1961).
117 See id. at 528.
118 Id. at 527.
119 See Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953).
112
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tion of estates, "
which was a purely procedural matter to be
decided according to the lex fi.
In cases where the traditional rule has been applied, the focus
has been on the place of actual death or injury, rather than on
the negligent acts that contribute to the eventual accident. In In
re AircrashDisasterNear Roselawn, Indiana on October 31, 1994, the
court held that the relevant locus was where "the last event takes
place, that is necessary to render the actor liable."'121 Similarly,
in a product liability action, the place of the accident, which is
where the injury is suffered, will apply22 rather than the place
where the product was manufactured. 1
The fortuitous nature of the lex loci delicti should not be overemphasized. If an aircraft crashes on take-off or landing, it can
hardly be said that the place of the crash was fortuitous. It was
well known that the aircraft would be involved in those operations at those particular places. Even when an aircraft crashes in
mid-flight, the impact that it will have on the community directly below surely gives that country an interest in the law applicable to the crash. The Lockerbie disaster of 1988 must still
have financial and psychological consequences on the population of that town and further afield in Scotland and the United
Kingdom. It would be comforting to know that in some of the
litigation arising from that crash, a court applied Scots locus law,
which permitted a higher recovery for families of victims than
did the other potentially applicable laws.' 2 3
In Europe, the lex loci is still adhered to in many countries,
and the escape devices that have been employed in American
courts have been badly received. In particular, France, the "paradigm"'1 24 of lex loci countries, is "more tenacious than most in its
unwillingness to allow departures from the application of the lex
loci delicti rule to tort cases.' 25 Morse detects a departure from
Id. at 949.
948 F. Supp. 747, 759 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (quoting Santana, Inc. v. Levi Strauss
& Co., 674 F.2d 269, 272 (4th Cir. 1982)).
122 See Kendrick v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 265 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1959).
123 In Shastri v. Pan American World Airways Inc., unreported (S.D. Fla. 1996),
the court held that Scotland had a strong interest in the litigation since Scottish
lives were lost on the ground as a result of the aircraft crash and the financial and
psychological impact on the community had been great. This was by application
of the SECOND RESTATEMENT'S test (see infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text)
but is illustrative of the interests that the locus delicti may have.
124 C.G.J. Morse, Choice of Law In Tort: A Comparative Survey, 32 Am.J. Comp. L.
51, 90 (1984).
125 Id. at 56.
120
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the traditional rule in that certain European countries allow exceptions along the lines of either a "common personal law" or
the law of the country that has a closer connection with the parties and the tort than the locus. 1 26 The extent to which such

developments in Europe have been influenced by the American
conflicts has been questioned. Many of the ideas which appear
in American writing can be traced to much earlier European
doctrinal works. 1 27 The final blow to the traditional lex loci rule
12
in tort came with the landmark case of Babcock v. Jackson, 1
which signaled the move towards policy-evaluation methods of
resolving the problems.
B.

COUNTING OF CONTACTS OR CENTER OF

GRAVray

APPROACH

In Babcock, the plaintiff and defendant were both New York
residents who were traveling in the defendant's car in Ontario,
Canada. The plaintiff was injured in an accident that was allegedly caused by the defendant driver's negligence. The Ontario
statute prevented the recovery of damages from the owner or
driver of a motor vehicle for the death of or injury to a
passenger.
Abandoning the lex loci approach, the New York Court of Appeals, seeking to uphold "Ij]ustice, fairness and 'the best practical result'," 29 applied "the law of the jurisdiction which, because
of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties
has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised." 130 In this
case, the accident involved a New York plaintiff, injured as a result of the negligence of a New York defendant, operating a car
that was garaged, licensed, and insured in New York, in the
course of a journey that began and should have ended in New
York. These considerations far outweighed the connection of
the wholly fortuitous place of the accident.
This flexible approach has the advantage of allowing greater
consideration of the interests of states or countries other than
the one in which the accident occurred. The lex loci delicti approach would have yielded a harsh and unjust result. Instead,
at 91.
127See Friedrich K. Juenger, American and European Conflicts Law, 30 Am. J.
CoMp. L. 117, 118-22 (1982) (describing the European roots of American conflicts' theories).
128 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
126 See id.

129 Id. at 283.
130

Id.
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the court's attention is directed' 131
"to the most logical place where
the parties' interests intersect."
Being so flexible, the Babcock decision left unanswered many
aspects of the new center of gravity approach. Would it be applicable only to automobile cases, and only automobile cases involving "guest" statutes of the type that Ontario had in this case?
Was it applicable only to personal injury cases or would it cover
wrongful death actions? Most importantly, would it always lead
to the application of the lex fori, or could a foreign law equally
constitute the law having the greatest concern with the specific
issue raised?
Subsequent cases extended the application of the Babcock rationale. The approach was applied to aviation cases and to
wrongful death actions arising from aviation accidents. 132 In
Long v. PanAmerican World Airways, Inc., 133 the court applied the

Babcock test to non-domiciliaries, without resolving the question
of whether this tends towards almost automatic application of lex
34
fori to forum domiciliaries.1
The simplicity of the Babcock approach is that it would seem to
lead to a straightforward adding up of contacts; but unless the
points of contact are carefully evaluated, this approach will ultimately become as mechanical as the lex loci delicti rule. In Babcock, there were clearly more contacts with New York than with
Ontario, so the result is fairly uncontroversial, but this will not
5
3
always be the case.1

Another difficulty is that the court in Babcock did not set down
a methodology whereby competing interests may be fairly balanced. While the result was treated by modern commentators as
a welcome inroad into the traditional system, its authority is
weakened by the fact that all of the theorists of the policy-evaluation school use the case to support their own theory. In the
words of one commentator, "the majority opinion contains
items of comfort for almost every critic of the traditional sys-

13, Lynn Darrow Carson, Choice of Law Issues in Mass Tort Litigation, 56J. AIR L.
& COM. 199, 219 (1990).
132 See, e.g., Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1964).
133 213 N.E.2d 796 (N.Y. 1965).
134 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Renvoi Among the Law Professors: An American's

View of the European View of American Conflict of Laws, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 99, 102
(1982).
135 See Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 284-85.
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tem.""'36 Nonetheless, viewed in its historical context, Babcock
began the development of a modern choice of law approach in
tort.
C.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

CONFLICT OF

LAwS, 1971-MOST

SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP TEST

The Restatement (Second) provided a formal framework in
which the modern approach to choice of law in tort could operate. Under its basic test, an issue in tort is determined by "the
local law of the state [that] has the most significant relationship
to the occurrence and the parties."'137 Prima facie, this will be
the law of the place of injury, "unless ... some other state has a
more significant relationship ... to the occurrence and the parties."138 However, the major improvement which the test has

made over the center of gravity test is that "it identifies the principles that should guide the court to evaluate the relative interests of the different jurisdictions on any given issue and . .. it

identifies the contacts that have primary importance in a choice
3 9

of law contest."1

According to section 6, the court should follow its own state
directives regarding choice of law, and if the forum has no clear
directive, several choice of law principles are suggested. 4 ° In
light of these principles, the court should examine the four potential points of contact that the incident might have. These are
the place of the injury, the place where the conduct that caused
the injury occurred, the domicile, residence, and place of business or incorporation of the parties, and the place where the
relationship between the parties, if any, is centered.'
Section
145 also specifies that this examination must be done for each
136 Brainerd Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in

Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. RFv. 1212, 1234 (1963).
117 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).
135

Id. §§ 146, 175.

136 KREINDLER, supra note 107, § 16.02, at 16-17.
140 RESTA'TEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). The six principles are: a) the needs of interstate and international systems; b) the relevant
policies of the forum and other interested states and their relative interests in
determining the particular issue; c) the protection of justified expectations; d)
the basic policies underlying the field of law; e) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result; and f) ease in the determination and application of the law to
be applied. See id.
141 See id. § 145.
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individual issue arising out of the tort, introducing expressly the
concept of dipefage.'42
With its broad range of principles and alternative connecting
factors, the Restatement (Second) allows for maximum flexibility. Moreover, sections 146 and 175 provide for a default rule,
that of the locus delicti, which is invaluable where two or more
states have an interest in having their own law applied.
The corollary of this is the resultant complexity. One writer
has commented that the Restatement (Second) makes "possible
every result without leading to any of them."' 3 The range of
possible judicial interpretations and factual situations which may
be brought within the scope of the test is such that "it is hard to
envisage individual decisions converging in time to produce a
body of desirable precedents and ultimately, in certain areas, desirable rules." 14 ' The only foreseeable method of development
of the test is its case-by-case application to the facts.
The section 6 principles are not designed to be exhaustive,
nor are they listed in order of importance. Thus, "the method
provides only partial guidance to the correct approach to choice
1
of law and furnishes no precise answers."15
But the Restatement (Second) does provide some guidance
nonetheless, which is an improvement over the Babcock approach. It may be that certain commentators and courts have
misunderstood what the Restatement (Second) was seeking to
achieve. It has been applied as a rule, rather than as a method
which provides factors for the court to consider.' 46
Nonetheless, the approach of the Restatement (Second) has
had considerable success in the United States,' 4 7 as well as recognition abroad. 48 In aviation cases, in particular, it has had
widespread application. In In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago,
Illinois on May 25, 1979, the court examined the law applicable
See id.
Bernard Hanotiau, The American Conflicts Revolution and European Tort
Choice-of-Law Thinking, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 73, 84 (1982).
144 David F. Cavers, The ProperLaw of Producer'sLiability, 26 INT'L & COMp. L.Q.
703, 713 (1977).
145Bogdan, supra note 106, at 336.
146 See Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REv.
315, 322-23 (1972).
147In Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Tenn. 1992), the court reviewed
choice of law rules in tort and opted to abandon lex loci delicti in favor of the
Second Restatement's approach.
148 See, e.g., Chaplin v. Boys, 1971 App. Cas. 356 (appeal taken from Eng.)
(comments of Lord Wilberforce).
142
143
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to the issue of the recovery of punitive damages by plaintiffs who
were residents of eleven American states, Puerto Rico, and three
foreign countries.'49 The court adopted the Restatement (Second) 's test determining "which, if any, of the states having some
relationship to the parties or to the crash has the most significant interest in the application of its own substantive law to the
merits of the punitive damage issue. '"150
In In re Air Crash Disaster at Washington, D. C. on January 13,

1982, the court had to ascertain the choice of law rule of certain
states' laws in a multi-state action consolidated before a single
federal court. 5 ' The court held that the courts of the states
whose law they were applying would have adopted the Restatement (Second)'s test if given the opportunity to do so.' 52 This
was despite the fact that in this case the court was not sitting in
the state whose choice of law rule they decided to change.
D.

GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS APPROACH

The leading proponent of this particular approach in the
United States was Currie. His underlying belief was in a movement towards abandoning the traditional, strict conflict of laws
rules and the almost uniform application of the lex fori. The
search is no longer for a rule that indicates the legal system that
will furnish the applicable rule of law, regardless of its content,
but for a more appropriate rule of decision, taking into account
the potentially applicable substantive laws.
A court applying this approach to a choice of law problem
must identify the specific substantive law in each state that might
be involved in the disputed issue and in doing so determine the
precise underlying policies which each law is intended to advance. Finally, the court must determine whether the application of a state's law would be consistent with the purposes or
policies identified as supporting that law."'
In Currie's view, this would mean almost always applying the
lexfori unless to do so would impair another state's policies more
than it would impair the forum's. This is further evidenced by
his use of terminology in describing the choice of law process.
The court should look to the lexfori as the source of a "rule of
149644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981).
u5o Id. at 610.
151 559 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1983).
152
153

See id. at 362.
See Carson, supra note 131, at 210-212.
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decision" not a "choice of law."1 54 This is verging on a return to
the long forgotten days of vested rights territorialism.
One leading writer has recognized the application of higher
standards as an overriding principle in the governmental interest approach as it relates to the duty of care, the standard of
conduct, and the quantum of damages.

55

In other words, a

state's law which is pro-plaintiff should always outweigh a state's
law which is pro-defendant. This thinking clearly undermines
the neutral character that a choice of law 156
rule is supposed to
have and is not borne out by the case law.
Central to this approach is Currie's alternative definition of a
"false" conflict. The conventional thinking was that a false conflict arose when the content of the substantive laws, which were
potentially applicable in a given case, were the same. 1 57 Currie
held there to be a false conflict in cases where only one state was8
15
held to have an interest in seeing its substantive law applied.
While on the face of it this approach seems sensitive to the
substantive laws being considered and to their respective purposes and interests, it is not immune from criticism. A state with
even a single contact could find in any given case an interest in
seeing its own law applied. In always considering prima facie
the application of the lexfori and in failing to deal with irreconcilable conflicts, a court applying this approach will, in Cavers's
view, fail "to consult the purposes of relevant laws elsewhere
than in the chosen forum,"1 59 which will tend to make choice of
law dependent on choice of forum.
In this respect, the variations of two states in particular where
much aviation litigation has been focused seem to bring improvements to Currie's original model.

154 See

id. at 210-11.
supra note 107, § 16.02, at 16-23.
156 See, e.g.,
Gordon v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 31, 34 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). In this case, which arose out of an airplane crash in the Florida Everglades, the court held that New York's governmental interest was in protecting its
own residents from anachronistic foreign laws denying recovery, and not in enhancing recovery by its residents by application of a more favorable foreign law.
This interest was held to be superior to that of Florida, the locus delicti, even to the
detriment of plaintiffs who were New York residents. See id.
157 See generally DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-or-LAw PROCESS (1965).
158 See Currie, supra note 136.
159 Cavers, supra note 144, at 717.
155 See KREINDLER,
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California

The Supreme Court of California, in a non-aviation case, explained the government interest approach as follows:
generally speaking the forum will apply its own rule of decision
unless a party litigant ... invokes the law of a foreign state. In
such event he must demonstrate that the latter rule of decision
will further the interest of the foreign state and therefore that it
is an appropriate one for the forum to apply. 6 '
This approach has since been characterized as the "comparative impairment" method.16 1 It requires the court to determine
the "relative commitment of the respective states to the laws involved . . . and the history and current status of the states'
laws." 162 Thus, if the state's policy behind a particular law is
found to have been stronger in the past than in the current climate, it may have to yield to the more modern and progressive
state law.
In the aviation context, the "comparative impairment" analysis received its most notable application in the famous case of In
re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974.163 This case provided the
prime example of the conflict of laws problem. The judge himself called it "Aega~onic, "164 involving as it did the crash of a
plane designed and manufactured by residents of California and
operated by Turkish Air Lines, and the deaths of 346 residents
and domiciliaries of twelve states of the United States and
twenty-four foreign countries. The number of dependants and
plaintiffs was unofficially estimated at about 1000. The judg165
ment was confined to the issue of recoverable damages
against the manufacturer. 66 Applying California's government
interest test, Judge Hall held that all three aspects of a damages
claim compelled the application of lexfori. The three state interests identified were (1) that of providing compensation for survivors of the decedents, (2) that of deterring negligent conduct
to defendants present within its borders, and (3) that of protect160Hurtado v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 522 P.2d 666, 670, (Cal.
1974).
161See, e.g., Offshore Rental Co., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721, 727
(Cal. 1978) (en banc).
162 Id.
163 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
164 Id. at 735.
1065Liability having been admitted.
166Such a claim is not covered by the Warsaw Convention. See generally Warsaw
Convention, supra note 6.
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ing resident defendants from excessive financial burdens
brought on by excessive awards of damages. The first interest
only applied to the forum residents, but the cumulative effect of
the other two interests along with the desire to provide a "uniform rule of liability and damages so that those who come under
the ambit of California's strict product liability law and market
their product outside of California... may know what risks they
are subject to when they make and sell their products"167 com-

pelled the application of California law.
This final conclusion seems to miss the obvious point. The
California resident defendants came within the ambit of that
state's strict product law because the suit had been filed in California and it had determined that lex fori should apply to the
issue of liability. There was no reason why a uniform foreign law
could not have been found to deal with both issues. Furthermore, Judge Hall held California's interest to be greater without
even ascertaining the content of the potentially applicable foreign laws.
Perhaps the judge's willingness to apply the lexfori to the damages issue, and hold that the application of the foreign law
would not further the interests of the foreign state, arose because to require him to apply the foreign law would require him
to "'guess' what the courts in 24 foreign and 12 domestic jurisdictions would hold on the facts in this case.' 68 While this
would have been an unenviable task for a single judge to undertake, it is precisely the task which a choice of law determination
entails.
2. New York
The example of the New York variation of the government
interest analysis also highlights certain flaws in the system.
In Neumeier v. Kuehner,6 9 the New York Court of Appeals formulated three guiding principles. Briefly summarized, an issue
in tort is determined by the law of the parties' common domicile, failing which the lex loci delicti if either party was a domiciliary of the locus state, failing which the lex loci delicti unless the
application of another state's laws would "advance the relevant
substantive law purposes. " 170 These rules have been held to ap167 In

re Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. at 743.

168 Id. at 739.
169
170

286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972).
Id. at 128-29.
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ply to all issues of damages,17 but it has been held that when
liability issues are under examination, "the law of the place of
1 72
the tort will normally apply."
It is ironic that New York, the state where dissatisfaction with
the traditional lex loci delicti first manifested itself, should have
taken a step backwards to a rule that creates a presumption in
favor of the law of the place of injury.
The Neumeier rules were applied in an aviation case by the federal appeal court sitting in New York in Barkanic v. General Administration of Civil Aviation of the People's Republic of China.' 73 This
case arose out of the crash of a domestic flight in China in which
two American passengers died. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act implicitly required the application of the choice of law
rules of the forum court, in this case the Neumeier rules. The
relevant Chinese law strictly limited wrongful death damages to
$20,000, while the laws of the decedents' domiciles, the District
of Columbia and New Hampshire, would have allowed for potentially unlimited recovery. The competing interests were identified as being those of the domicile states "to maximize
recovery for its domiciliaries, avoid the possibility that its domiciliaries become public charges and . . . ensure that medical
creditors in the state will be paid,"'' 7 4 and that of China in "the
prevention of outflows of capital and resources indispensable to
'
the development of its infant airline industry."175
Holding itself bound by the Neumeier-Schultz rules, the Second
Circuit held that because the parties had different domiciles, because the injury occurred in the domicile of the defendant and
because that law favored the defendant, so the lex loci, Chinese
law, should apply.
It has been suggested that the court misapplied the New York
choice of law approach. The Neumeier-Schultz rules dealt with
conflicts between what has been termed "loss allocation" laws,
and not, as in Barkanic, between a domiciliary law, which pro-

Cooney v. Osgood Mach., Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1993).
Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 701 (N.Y. 1985).
173I 923 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1991).
174 Yves Van Couter, Barkanic: The New York Choice-of-Law Method and Recovery
for Air Crashes Abroad, 60J. AIR L. & COM. 759, 791 (1995).
171
172

175

Id. at 791-92.
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tected and preserved human life and a locus law, which had an
17 6
economic and national security interest.
Barkanicwas the first aviation case to apply the Neumeier rules.
The wisdom of such a development is debatable. The original
rules were intended to have limited scope, dealing only with the
frequent question of what effect to give to a foreign guest statute
in a motor vehicle accident. The relationship between an air
carrier and its fare-paying passenger is entirely different from
that existing between a driver and his guest-passenger. The
route chosen by the aircraft is not as certain and predictable as
that of a motor car and can change in mid-flight. The passenger
has no say in the choice of route.
There are obvious weaknesses in interest analysis. There are
the problems inherent in ascertaining a single purpose or policy
behind a state's law. The same statute might allow for strict liability, which is favorable to plaintiffs, but then limit the amount
of damages recoverable from domiciliary defendants, which is
favorable to defendants. Hence most states that have adopted
this approach "begin by using interest analysis to weed out false
conflicts." 7 7 This avoids many of the problems that a more intensive search for government interest would entail.
Even if a purpose is discovered, the outcome of the interest
analysis is uncertain. The lex loci delicti has an interest in applying to tort cases because it seeks to deter negligent conduct, to
protect state authorities from bearing the cost of medical care,
or altruistically, to protect plaintiffs who reside abroad. But
equally convincing is the argument that a plaintiff will probably
leave the state of injury anyway, altruism is not the current guiding philosophy in society, and deterrence is an outdated ideal.
Furthermore, in the absence of a default rule, if there is no purpose to be found behind a particular law, the system becomes
unworkable. The result is often the application of lex fori for
want of a law of a state with a greater interest.
Government interest analysis, therefore has many unsatisfactory aspects, but on a practical level, it has freed courts from the
rigidity of the traditional lex loci rule and allowed for more just
results without necessarily opening the floodgates. As one lead176 See David E. Seidelson, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Whose Conflicts
Law? Whose Local Law ?, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 427, 452 (1992) (concluding that even
under a more flexible interest analysis the same result would have been reached).
177 J. James Fawcett, Is American Governmental Interest Analysis the Solution to English Tort Choice of Law Problems?, 31 INT'l, & COMP. L.Q. 150, 154 (1982).
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ing writer has observed, "the prediction that every potential conflicts case would be litigated and appealed because the outcome
was always unpredictable seems not to have come true, at least
not with the force and frequency once expected."' v
E.

LEFLAR'S "CHOICE INFLUENCING FACTORS"

One of the leading academics in this field, Leflar, has proposed an alternative approach to the resolution of the choice of
law problem. 179 Under his theory, applicable to any choice of
law problem, the court examines the issue at hand in the light of
five factors to determine the applicable law: (1) the predictability of the result; (2) the maintenance of interstate and international order; (3) the simplification of the judicial task; (4) the
advancement of the forum's governmental interest; and (5) the
application of the better rule of law. 8
The last of these considerations is the most innovative. In the
context of the flexible choice of law approaches, it seems the
most intellectually honest, as it permits a value judgment on the
part of the court. It also expressly mentions the needs of the
international order, thus making it the least inward-looking of
the American theories. Leflar's approach is much more "proactive than the governmental interest analysis because it permits
courts to weigh various governmental-interests and determine
their current importance to each interested state."''
In the tort context, however, the first two considerations are
usually irrelevant. This will usually result in the favoring of the
third and fourth considerations and the almost inevitable application of lexfori. This theory thereby allows the court to give an
"apparently rational basis to a decision that in fact is based on an
82
informed feeling of justice or equity."
The major conceptual problem with a "better law" approach,
which Leflar defines as the "[s] uperiority of one rule of law over
another, in terms of socio-economic jurisprudential standards," 113 is that it is excessively subjective, granting too much
power to the judge. It goes without saying that the parties will
scarcely ever agree on what constitutes the better law.
178 Lowenfeld, supra note 134, at 101.

179See Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41

N.Y.U. L. REv. 267 (1966).
180See id. at 282.
181 Carson, supra note 131, at 223.
182Hanotiau, supra note 143, at 82.
18-3Leflar, supra note 179, at 296.
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Leflar's intention was to serve the ends of justice better by
setting the litigation in a "more impersonal, less subjective"
framework, rather than by choosing one or the other party.'
But this approach is fallacious. It ignores the reality of the judicial function. The court does not analyze the case in the abstract and state which of two laws has a higher objective
standard. It must decide the case and controversy laid before it
between two competing parties.
F.

CAVERS'S "PRINCIPLES OF PREFERENCE"

Cavers's dissatisfaction with the traditional choice of law process has already been touched upon.185 In The Choice-of-Law Process published in 1965, he sets out five principles to govern
choice of law in tort. He proceeds from the same starting point
as Currie's governmental interest analysis, that of eliminating
false conflicts.186 Thereafter in true conflict cases, he argues,
the court should "decide the case on its merits, taking into consideration the objectives and policies which govern the law of
conflicts." 8 7 This is to be done in line with certain principles
which he proposes, with the aim of yielding results which appreciate the legitimate state interests involved and the needs ofjustice for individuals.
The five principles of preference, which Cavers stresses are
not exhaustive, can be broadly summarized as follows:
(1) Where the liability laws of the lex loci delicti are more
favorable to the plaintiff than the defendant's domiciliary law or
the law where he acted, then the traditional lex loci rule should
apply, in the absence of a pre-existing relationship between the
parties, the law of which might govern.
(2) Where the liability laws of the place where the defendant
acted or caused injury are more favorable to the defendant than
the laws of the plaintiffs domicile, then the former should apply, again in the absence of a pre-existing relationship between
parties. This second principle envisages the case where neither
party is a domiciliary of the place of injury.
(3) If the state where the defendant acted accords special protection against the kind of conduct complained of, which the lex
loci does not accord, the plaintiff should be allowed to benefit
184
185

186

187

Id. at 297.
See Cavers, supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
See id.
Hanotiau, supra note 143, at 80.
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from the special protection of the former. This is designed to
deal with cases of product liability.
(4) Where the law of the place where a relationship has its
seat imposes a standard of conduct or financial protection on
one party to that relationship which is higher than the like standard imposed by the state of injury, the former should apply to
the benefit of that party protected by that state's law.
(5) Finally, where the law of the place where the relationship
has its seat imposes a standard of conduct or financial protection on one party to that relationship which is lower than the
standard imposed by the state of injury, the former should apply
to the benefit of the party whose liability that state's law would
deny or limit.'8 "
The problem with these principles is that they are framed in a
detailed, formalistic manner. They do not deal with every possible situation arising from a conflict of laws in tort case. Cavers's
intention, however, was that the principles, which were "stated
in very broad terms . . . would be subjected to fission as distinctions were drawn .... What had begun as a principle would be

converted into a set of specific rules."' 89
Using the example of the 1974 Paris air crash, 9 ° Cavers highlights the problems that some of the other flexible choice of law
approaches create. In that case, California law was applied to
the issue of damages against a Californian manufacturer, on the
basis of California's government interest in protecting its resident defendants from excessive damages awards.'
California
law turned out to be relatively favorable to the plaintiffs as well.
If the result had been the contrary, Cavers inquires
"[s]hould ...

the few... aircraft-producing States ...

have the

unchallenged authority to provide the proper law?"' 92 Because
the other possibilities were unattractive to him, in that the lex
loci delicti is fortuitous, and the multiple contacts approach
would lead to multiple suits, Cavers supports a proposal for a nofault system to deal with aviation disasters with government par93
ticipation in insurance.1

See id. at 80-81.
1'
CAVERS, supra note 157, at 137.
190 In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
1,,9See id. at 749
192 Cavers, supra note 144, at 733.
188

193 See id.
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Cavers's contentions as to the government interest analysis
and as to lex loci are sustainable, but it seems that a rule based on
multiple contacts is the most suitable approach to take.
G.

ECLECTICISM

The varying tests and approaches that have been employed by
jurisdictions in the United States have led to the development of
composite approaches that employ facets of one or more of the
modern theories. Few courts apply any of the theories in "pure"
' and
form. This phenomenon has been termed "eclecticism"194
allows for maximum flexibility. It allows a court to consider the
"same positive and negative features as the facets of the theories
it has chosen to merge.' 95
The major difficulty with the eclectic approach is that a court
often has to analyze a case by applying the choice of law rule of
another state. This is especially important in the context of
mass disaster litigation in the United States when multiple cases
are transferred to one federal court. For each case, the court
has to apply the choice of law rule of the state from whose court
it was transferred. This will be hard to ascertain when the
choice of law rule is an amalgam of several theories.
The foregoing survey of the modem approaches to choice of
law in the United States provides a wealth of examples of theories and approaches that deal with the particular nature of aviation torts on choice of law. However, the extent to which they
differ is unclear. "Although they require the use of different
terminologies, the analytical inquiries employed are very similar."' 96 On any given set of facts, it would be possible to arrive at
the same result by applying any one of the theories.
H.

REESE'S SPECIFIC AvIATION RULES

The most radical set of proposals come in an article written in
1982 by Reese, in which he formulates choice of law rules specifically to govern aircraft accidents.' 9 7 He proposes a series of
rules to deal with different plaintiffs and different defendants
and criticizes the modern approach to choice of law, which he
194

See EUGENE F.
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19-'KREINDLER, supra note 107,

§ 17.11 (1982).

§ 16.02[7] [b], at 16-30.
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See Willis L.M. Reese, The Law Governing Airplane Accidents, 39
L. REv. 1303 (1982).
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sees as inappropriate to govern such cases due to their unpredictable nature.
In the same year, in a different article, Reese wrote that predictability and uniformity of result are not of particular significance to the choice of law in tort.' 98 Although with his specific
Aviation Rules, Reese recognizes the particular nature of aviation tort law, this weakens the credibility of his previous arguments against a rules-based approach. His position is somewhat
ironic, given the great influence he has wielded over the modern developments in choice of law in tort. One commentator
felt that in this article, Reese writes "as if the American 'conflict
revolution' never happened."'99
However, aside from the inconsistencies that they reveal in his
thinking, Reese's suggestions have the advantage of giving the
plaintiff a choice between several available laws, within the
framework of established choice of law rules. This allows for
great flexibility, but takes the ultimate choice out of the hands
of the judge. Reese suggests that the existence of choice of law
rules in this field would also allow for speedier settlement of
claims and would curtail lengthy litigation. His proposed rules
always favor the plaintiff over the defendant, which is "in line
with what is thought to be the basic
policy underlying the law in
20 0
the field of personal injuries."
As between passenger and manufacturer on issues both of liability and damages, Reese suggests that there are four connecting factors that might determine the applicable law to be chosen
by the plaintiff: place of design or manufacture, principal place
of business of manufacturer, place of departure, or intended
destination.201

As between passenger and carrier, the issue of liability would
be governed by the Warsaw Convention in the international
context.20 2 With regard to damage issues, Reese suggests that
the passenger should have the choice between the place where
the carrier maintained, inspected, or repaired the aircraft; their
principal place of business; the place of departure; or the place
of intended destination.20 3
198

See Reese, supra note 111, at 135.

19 Bogdan, supra

note 106, at 339.
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The issue of punitive damages differs from the rest of Reese's
proposed scheme. Since punitive damages are designed solely
to punish the defendant, the applicable law should focus on the
defendant's territorial attachments, such as its place of business
204
or the place where it manufactured or maintained its aircraft.
Reese's proposals are worthy of consideration because they
give the greatest choice available to the plaintiff to maximize
recovery. This should be the overriding aim of a choice of law
rule in aviation delict and tort. Unfortunately, Reese expressly
excludes the passenger's personal law, on the basis that it would
lead to unequal treatment of persons who have suffered the
same fate. Inequality of treatment is not wrong in principle.
Reese is a strong proponent of the concept of dpevage in
choice of law. 20 5 His proposals in this article reflect this. Dipefage allows for the laws of different states to apply to different
issues in the same case. In Reese's view, "the court should seek
to apply the relevant rule of the state which has the greatest concern in the determination of that issue. 20 6 This seems to him
an integral part of the modern approach to choice of law and
can lead to results that the exclusive application of a substantive
law might preclude. Dpefage should be avoided only when it
would lead to "a situation where the purpose
of one or more of
20 7
the rules applied would be distorted."

V. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
The contrast between the highly developed and sophisticated
choice of law approaches in the United States and the complete
lack of judicial authority in the United Kingdom on aviation delict and tort choice of law is striking. There are a variety of reasons which explain this phenomenon.
In terms of size and technology, the United States air transportation system is at least thirty years ahead of Europe. As a
consequence, it is hardly surprising that aviation litigation
should have been focused in the United States. The liberal
rules concerning jurisdiction mean that American courts are reluctant to sustain pleas of forum non conveniens. The advantages for a plaintiff of bringing a case in the United States are
See id. at 1317.
See Willis L.M. Reese, Dipefage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73
COLUM. L. REv. 58 (1973).
206 Id. at 59.
207 Id. at 75.
204
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considerable. American courts award higher damages, particularly punitive damages, and they favor the extensive use of the
doctrine of strict liability. Under American law, contingency
fees are permitted, which in essence makes the bringing of an
action a win-only situation for the plaintiff. Under the United
States Constitution, the right to trial by jury, even in civil matters, is guaranteed. 20 8 The amount of damages awarded by ajury
will almost always be greater than that awarded by a judge, because ajury will be swayed by the human element of the tragedy
involved.
Aviation tort law in the United States has been instrumental
in highlighting the shortcomings of the traditional contactsbased approaches to conflict of laws. There has been a movement towards creating uniform substantive rules to deal with air
transport. On an international level, this has taken the form of
the Warsaw Convention and its subsequent amendments. It has
also become important in the United States in the domestic context with calls for the development of uniform federal rules. In
Morse's view, this is based on the "notion that all victims of one
air disaster should be treated alike. 20 9
Although American courts have dealt with these matters, frequently modern American approaches to choice of law in aviation may be unsuitable for transplanting to the United Kingdom
"due to their inter-provincial background and their almost to'
tally unpredictable results. "210
Fawcett suggests that the modern American approaches succeed only because of the presence of certain background conditions and, conversely, that they require these conditions to exist
before they will function. These include "the presence of a
'Supreme Court,' a similarity in the laws of the forum and the
other concerned States, an availability of aids to statutory interpretation, a wealth of materials on comparative law and a contingency fee system. "1211
The searching examination that interest analysis requires,
which is possible on an inter-state level, is unrealistic on an international level. It would be relatively straightforward for a
New York court to ascertain the interests and policies of Florida,
California, or Louisiana law; but for a Scottish judge to deter208 U.S. CONST. amend. VI1.
209 C.GJ. MORSE, TORTS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
2101 Bogdan,
211

supra note 106, at 343.
Fawcett, supra note 177, at 166.

323 (1978).
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mine which of the conflicting interests of Chinese, Norwegian,
or Australian law were paramount becomes an almost impossible task. Yet it is just such examples of problems that the conflict of laws in aviation delict or tort could pose. This criticism is
borne out by the fact that on the occasions when an American
court has. had to ascertain the purpose
of a foreign law, it has
2 12
made sweeping assumptions about it.
Fawcett highlights the weaknesses of the interest analysis approach, again citing the example of the Paris air crash case.
" [W] here there are practical difficulties in operating interest
analysis ...

the court will automatically end up applying forum

law and
may not even enquire into the content of the foreign
3
law."

21

It would seem, therefore, that the policy-evaluation methods
of the type adopted in recent years in the United States would
be inappropriate for adoption in the United Kingdom. While
certainty of result is not a primary requirement for the conflict
of laws rule in tort, the more flexible approaches become too
complex. They place too much discretion in the hands of the
judge and favor the application of lexfori, but under the pretext
of a far-reaching search for a just solution.
The direction that the United Kingdom has taken in this area
with the 1995 Act is the correct one. It maintains a contactsbased rule, while allowing for possible exceptions. However, the
connecting factor that the new Act sets down, that of the place
of the delict, is ill-suited to aviation claims. A different law
needs to be applicable to different issues, in particular to liability and to damages. The fortuitous nature of the place of delict
when an aircraft is involved is so much stronger than in the ordinary delict case that a more appropriate connecting factor must
be sought.
In a claim against air carriers, the regime of the Warsaw Convention provides a uniform rule on liability. As against aircraft
manufacturers, a similar uniform rule would be advisable, failing which, the law of its place of incorporation or principal
place of business would be most appropriate as its "personal law"
to regulate its conduct.
212 See, e.g., Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 479 F. Supp. 727, 735-36 (M.D. Pa.
1979) (on Scots law); Shastri v. Pan Am. World Airways Inc., unreported (S.D.
Fla. 1996) (arising from the Lockerbie disaster; the court held that the policy
behind the Scots law of recovery for solatium outweighed those of the decedents'
domiciliary laws).
213 Fawcett, supra note 177, at 162.
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On questions of recoverable damages, if all victims of the
same air disaster should be treated according to the same law,
because to hold otherwise would create injustice and inequality
between persons who have suffered the same trauma, and if a
contacts-based approach is to be preferred to the modern interest-based approaches, the only possible connecting factor is the
lex loci. However, total equality in the treatment of passengers
may not always be possible since, depending on which version of
the Warsaw Convention their country is party to, they may not
be subject to the same regime anyway. Furthermore, the other
advantage of the lex loci approach, its predictability, is not always
present in an aviation case. The evidence that links the events
that constitute the delict to a single jurisdiction may be impossible to recover and the injury may be found to have occurred
over several jurisdictions.
The desire for a single applicable law to govern all the victims
of an aviation delictual or tortious act is a fallacious one, certainly on the issue of recoverable damages. A more appropriate
connecting factor may be what could be generally termed the
victim's "personal law," focusing upon the domicile, residence,
or nationality of the decedent. In the United Kingdom, the focus has traditionally been on a residence-based approach. It is
not within the scope of this work to examine the merits of habitual residence, domicile, or nationality as an appropriate connecting factor.
However, the personal law, in its broadest meaning, has several connections with an aviation delict involving the plaintiff. It
is the law most familiar to the passenger, and most in line with
the economic and social conditions to which he was accustomed. It is the law that will govern the legal consequences of
the passenger's death, such as the administration of his estate or
succession. It is likely to be the law of the places where survivors
of the victims are living and to which their legal relationships
are subject.
If we limit the search for applicable law to issues of damages,
such as heads of damages, elements of recovery, and title to sue,
the link with the passenger's personal law becomes all the more
evident. The question of recoverable damages is a wholly personal one, the loss suffered being entirely different in each case.
There is no conceptual difficulty in inequality between victims.
Such a proposal has the support of the aviation industry. The
International Air Transport Association (IATA) has approved an
intercarrier agreement to waive the limits of the Warsaw Con-

1998]

CONFLICT OF LAWS

vention so that damages may be governed by the law of the domicile of the passenger. 1 4 The agreement received the added
impetus of support from the European Commission in December 1995, when the Commission approved a Proposal for a
Council Regulation to give effect to the IATA agreement.2 1 5 This
has also been long supported by one commentator who suggested its incorporation into the Warsaw Convention as a uniform choice of law rule. 16
If the requirement of equal treatment of all victims is, nonetheless, deemed to be essential, and the lex loci is to be avoided,
the only other option is to focus on the territorial links of the
aircraft, either its operators' principal place of business, or the
law of the place of its registration. This law has the advantage 2of
17
being "easy to establish and foresee for all parties involved."
It seems similar to the application of a nationality to ships, and
would inevitably raise the same problems which have arisen in
that area of law of flags of convenience. For the reasons already
discussed, the analogy between ships and aircraft is
inappropriate.1
It has been shown that in the United Kingdom, the provisions
of the 1995 Act are neither clear on the question of the law applicable to an aviation delict or tort case, nor adequate to deal
with its complexities. It is unclear whether the new Act applies
to such cases, and even if it does, it fails to take into account the
particular nature of the problem. The guidance that has been
sought from the case law of the United States is also unhelpful.
Given the differing contexts and environments in which litigation takes place in the United States and in the United Kingdom, the type of inquiry that the policy evaluation methods
requires is inappropriate for export to the United Kingdom.
We should endorse the use of dpe~age in this area, since it
allows the most appropriate law for the resolution of individual
issues to be applied. As to the liability of airlines, the quasi strict
liability approach of the Warsaw Convention appears to provide
an adequate scheme. As to the liability of aircraft manufacturIATA Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability, 1995, Kuala Lumpur.
Proposal for a Council Regulation on Air Carrier Liability in Case of Air
Accidents, 1995.
216 See Allan I. Mendelsohn, A Conflict ofLaws Approach to the Warsaw Convention,
33J. AIR L. & CoM. 624, 628 (1967).
217 Bogdan, supra note 106, at 346.
218 See LAw COMMISSION REPORT No. 193 AND ScoTTisH LAW COMMISSION REPORT No. 129, supra note 76,
3.26-27.
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ers, they could be brought within the regime of the Convention,
failing which the personal law of the manufacturers would be
most appropriate to regulate their conduct. On questions of recoverable damages, we should adopt a contacts-based approach,
founded on the personal law of the victim to take account of the
horrific nature of the consequences of delictual or tortious liability in an aviation context and the individual injury and loss
suffered.
If aviation litigation develops in the United Kingdom as expected, we can look forward to an interesting and challenging
future in the areas which have been examined in this article.
The route that those developments will take is unclear. What is
evident from this look at United States approaches is that the
evolution of the law needs to be coherent. If so, we should expect, if not clear skies ahead, then at least as little turbulence as
possible.
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